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Understanding Stability in Cognitive Neuroscience Through Hacking's Lens1 
Abstract: Ian Hacking instigated a revolution in 20th century philosophy of science by 
putting experiments (“interventions”) at the top of a philosophical agenda that historically had 
focused nearly exclusively on representations (“theories”). In this paper, I focus on a set of 
conceptual tools Hacking (1992) put forward to understand how laboratory sciences become 
stable and to explain what such stability meant for the prospects of unity of science and kind 
discovery in experimental science. I first use Hacking’s tools to understand sources of instability 
and disunity in rodent behavioral neuroscience. I then use them to understand recent grass-roots 
collaborative initiatives aimed at establishing stability in this research area and tease out some 
implications for unity of science and kind creation and discovery in cognitive neuroscience. 
Keywords: cognition; laboratory science; natural kinds; stability; unity of science 
A primary aim of cognitive neuroscience is to understand the neural underpinnings of 
human cognition. Cognitive neuroscience roughly may be divided into two branches, one which 
focuses on humans and human clinical populations, and the other, which focuses on non-human 
animals (e.g., non-human primates, rodents). In this paper, I will be concerned primarily with 
rodent behavioral neuroscience. Intervention experiments in rodents are crucial for identifying 
the neural mechanisms that give rise to cognition in humans; rodents afford the possibility of 
using state-of-the-art techniques to alter genetic, molecular, or circuit-level activity and 
determine the impact of such manipulations on behavioral performance in tasks designed to 
assess human relevant cognitive functions. Consider a cognitive function like decision-making, 
in which an organism has to make a choice between two available actions. A rodent behavioral 
researcher may design a task to assess decision-making in mice and artificially alter the activity 
of a population of neurons (e.g., dopamine neurons in the medial striatum) in vivo as mice 
perform the task in order to assess the impact of this manipulation on the mouse’s performance. 
The same basic approach may be used to investigate a range of cognitive functions including: 
working memory, cognitive flexibility, attention, motivation and response inhibition, to name 
only a handful. Insofar as rodent behavioral research occurs in laboratories and involves the use 
of “apparatus used in isolation to interfere” (1992, 34) and, as I will show, to “create new 
phenomena”, it may be regarded as constituting a laboratory science in Hacking’s sense.2   
During the past two decades, a picture has emerged in philosophy of science with respect 
to how areas of neuroscience directed at understanding the neural underpinnings of cognition, 
like rodent behavioral neuroscience, make progress (e.g., Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007; Picinnini 
& Craver 2011). The basic idea is that neuroscientists seek multi-level mechanistic explanations 
that describe the physical entities/components (e.g., neurons, neural circuits) and 
 
1The author would like to thank Matteo Vagelli and Marica Setaro for helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper.   
2Hacking (1992, 37) is not interested in “research at the frontiers of inquiry”, which “can be as unstable as 
you please”. Rodent behavioral neuroscience, insofar as it employs cutting-edge tools, is thus not an example of a 
stable science. My aim in this paper, however, is to use Hacking’s tools to identify features of rodent behavioral 
neuroscience that investigators themselves believe jeopardize the production of stable knowledge—knowledge that 
they regard as necessary for progress in their field. I aim to show that Hacking’s tools may be used to characterize 
the kind of stable knowledge this area of science lacks and that some scientists working in this area seek. As I see it, 
Hacking’s descriptive conceptual tools may be prescriptively used to understand how to stabilize laboratory sciences 
(even if he did not intend them to be used in this way). 
 2 
activities/processes (e.g., neuronal firing, neurotransmitter release) that bring phenomena of 
interest (e.g., reward-based learning) about. To take a widely cited example from the 
philosophical literature, activation of N-methyl-D aspartate receptors in area CA1 of the rat 
hippocampus is one component in the description of the multi-level mechanism of spatial 
memory (e.g., Craver 2007). Progress in neuroscience on the mechanistic view occurs as 
findings from experiments being undertaken in the same and different areas of neuroscience are 
“seamlessly integrated” into descriptions of multi-level mechanisms of cognitive phenomena 
(e.g., Picinnini & Craver 2011).  
This view of progress in the mind-brain sciences has arisen primarily from the 
perspective of the philosophy of explanation, in the absence of careful evaluation of the precise 
kind of knowledge that individual neuroscientific experiments and research studies yield and 
absent an analysis of how results from different studies actually fit together. In the last two 
decades of the 20th century, however, Hacking (e.g., 1983, 1991, 1992) urged philosophers of 
science to relinquish their exclusive focus on “representations” (i.e., theories, explanations) and 
turn their attention to experiments (“interventions”)—those processes by which phenomena are 
produced or “created” in scientific laboratories. In this paper, I use conceptual tools that Hacking 
put forward to evaluate experimental practices in rodent behavioral neuroscience. I focus 
primarily on a set of conceptual tools that Hacking (1991, 1992) put forward to understand the 
stability of the laboratory sciences, which he used to tease out implications for the prospects of 
unity of science and kind discovery in experimental science.  
     I begin, in Section 1, by identifying some preliminary features of rodent behavioral 
neuroscience. The aim is to provide enough detail that Hacking’s taxonomic framework for 
understanding stability in experimental science may later be applied. I then consider Hacking’s 
(1991) claim that disunity is not a temporary feature of science, but, indeed, a permanent aspect 
of the scientific landscape, because, despite Thomas Kuhn’s (1961) claims about revolutions in 
science, science does accumulate, and some parts do become stable—a kind of local stability that 
is antithetical to global unity of science. I then describe the conceptual tools that Hacking (1992) 
introduced and used in order to understand how laboratory science becomes stable, and I use 
these tools for two purposes. First, I apply them to characterize the sources of current instability 
in rodent behavioral neuroscience. Second, I use them to illuminate strategies of stabilization 
currently being collaboratively implemented in the context of two grass-roots initiatives in this 
field. I conclude by teasing out implications pertaining to unity of neuroscience and the nature of 
the kinds that neuroscience, on Hacking’s view, is likely to discover.  
 
1. Some preliminary observations about rodent behavioral research 
  In neuroscience, rodent behavioral studies may be aimed at understanding species-
specific cognition (e.g, mouse cognition), but rodents are more commonly used as models for 
humans—mammalian “stand-ins” that afford the possibility of combining tasks to assess 
cognition with cutting-edge visualization (e.g., fiber photometry) and intervention (e.g., 
optogenetics) technologies for intervening in molecular, cellular, and neural circuit activity to 
determine the impact of such interventions on cognitive functioning. Mouse models of 
neuropsychiatric, neurodegenerative and other brain disorders (e.g., concussion) also are 
regarded as crucial for identifying the neural mechanisms that underlie impairments in cognitive 
functions such as memory, attention and decision-making that accompany these disorders and 
developing effective therapeutic interventions to treat them.     
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      One cognitive function that is crucial for navigating the world on a daily basis, and that is 
impaired in neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer’s disease, is pattern separation – namely, 
the ability to distinguish memories from each other, to separate one memory pattern from the 
next. Consider a simple illustrative example (Beckinschtein, Kent, Ooman, et al., 2013). If you 
drive a car to school or the office, it is likely that you park your car in a different spot each day. 
Yet, you typically are able to remember where you parked your car in the parking lot each day, 
despite parking in a different spot from day to day. This is an instance of pattern separation.  
  One task that neuroscientists have used to study pattern separation in rodents is the 
Spontaneous Location Recognition (SLR) task. In one version of this task, a rodent is placed in 
an open circular arena and allowed to habituate to that environment. Three novel stimuli 
(different objects) are then introduced. In a simple version of the task, there is a sample phase in 
which two of the objects are placed 50° apart from each other and the third object is placed 
equidistant from each of the other two. The mouse is then placed into the arena to explore. In the 
choice phase of the task, which occurs 24 hours after the sample phase, two novel copies of the 
two objects that were placed 50° apart during the sample phase are presented. This time, 
however, one of the two objects is placed in a novel location (a location equidistant between its 
previous location and the “familiar” location of the other object).3 Given that mice prefer 
novelty, a mouse that spends more time exploring the object in the novel location compared to 
the object in the familiar location divided by the total time it spends exploring is considered to 
have successfully “pattern separated”—i.e., to have a memory that enables them to distinguish 
the object in the novel location from the object in the familiar one (See Beckinschtein, Kent, 
Ooman, et al. 2013).  
  Rodent behavioral neuroscience is an interdisciplinary area of science that brings together 
investigators hailing from a variety of different fields including: genetics, animal behavior, 
neurophysiology, biochemistry and computational neuroscience, to name only a handful. Tasks 
like SLR may be combined with a variety of different visualization and intervention techniques 
that allow the activity of molecules, cells, and circuits to be detected and manipulated to 
determine the impact on behavioral performance. Mouse models of neuropsychiatric and 
neurodegenerative disease and other brain disorders (e.g., concussion) may be used in order to 
identify disruptions in neural circuit activity that underlie impaired performance on such tasks. 
There are many different apparatuses (e.g., mazes, open fields, classical conditioning chambers, 
touchscreen operant chambers (described in section 4)) and tasks (e.g., SLR, contextual fear 
conditioning, social recognition, paired associates learning) that rodent behavioral researchers 
may use in combination with intervention techniques to investigate the neural bases of different 
kinds of cognitive functions.   
 With this brief introduction to rodent behavioral neuroscience, I turn now to Hacking’s views 
about disunity of science. 
  
2. Disunified sciences  
 In “Disunified Sciences” (1991), Hacking identifies and evaluates a set of eleven theses 
characteristic of logical positivist understandings of the unity of science. I want to briefly 
consider a relevant subset of these, given that certain aspects of unity of science conceived of by 
the logical positivists remain implicit in contemporary thinking about progress in areas of 
neuroscience like rodent behavioral neuroscience. Specifically, recent arguments for unification 
 
3 As rodents have a keen sense of smell, new, identical objects are used in the choice phase to rule out the possibility 
that the rodents are using olfactory cues to perform the task.  
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focus on explanatory integration, which involves the integration of data from multiple 
experiments into explanations of cognitive functions (e.g., Craver 2007; Craver, Piccinini 2011). 
Yet, such integration is only possible if the constructs designating cognitive functions under 
which data from different experiments are being integrated are stable. As I will argue later in the 
paper, there are good reasons to think they are not.  
Among the unity theses that Hacking (1991, 41) considers are two “metaphysical theses”: 
(1) there is a single world, and it contains diverse kinds of phenomena that are (2) 
“interconnected”. The epistemic aim of science is to understand this single world and science 
offers the best method for attaining such understanding. The logical positivists expressed 
confidence in the idea that “there is one right fundamental system of classifying everything” 
(taxonomic thesis), that will be expressed in a single scientific language (e.g., physics) (linguistic 
thesis) that identifies the stable regularities and tracks so-called “natural kinds” (Hacking 1991, 
41). They believed that science gradually approximates towards this one right system by means 
of intertheoretic reduction (reductionist thesis)-namely, the establishment of bridge laws, as 
terms in reducing and reduced theories are connected (connectability), and reducing theories 
come to explain all the phenomena originally explained by the reduced theory (derivability). In 
the process, unity of science is achieved, as “many facts” are brought “under the wing of one 
intellectual structure” (Hacking 1991, 41). Moreover, the achievement of unity was not only 
descriptively accurate with respect to the history of science, but also an “on-going trend” in the 
heyday of logical positivism (Oppenheim, Putnam 1958).  
Hacking aims to demonstrate that none of these unity theses are applicable to 
contemporary science. I am particularly interested in his arguments against intertheoretic 
reduction and the discovery of a single system of scientific classification that tracks natural 
kinds. Hacking offers two different lines of argument here. First, he points to the sheer diversity 
in language and methods that we find in contemporary science and the difficulties that heads of 
academic departments face in trying to unify different areas of science that may generally be 
classified as, for example, “biological”, within a single “super-department” (Hacking 1991, 43). 
He points out that even Oppenheim and Putnam, who advocated for unity via theory reduction, 
and described it as an ongoing trend in science, themselves acknowledged certain “incompatible 
trends” in science that were antithetical to unity. Hacking also points to how “overspecialized” 
science has become to the extent that “in a quite straightforward sense there is no common 
language of science, and [. . .] as a matter of practicability, there could not be” (Hacking, 1991, 
44). Yet, Hacking, agreeing with philosopher of science Patrick Suppes, does not regard “the 
irreducible pluralism of languages of science” as an obstacle to “the continued growth of 
science” (Suppes 1984, 121 as quoted in Hacking 1991, 44). 
Hacking’s second related strategy for establishing the disunity of science is to argue that 
much of contemporary science, rather than moving towards theoretical unity, becomes stable 
within a restricted domain. He relies in part on examples from physics to support this claim. For 
example, he points to scientists like Sheldon Glashow and Werner Heisenberg who have 
described Newtonian mechanics and classical quantum mechanics as theories that are not 
universally true, but “valid in [their] domain” (Hacking 1991, 48). Hacking notes that “the idea 
of a closed theory with its domain at once suggests disunity: different domains governed by 
different theories” (Hacking 1991, 48) rather than theory displacement or theory reduction. 
Hacking insists that from the vantage point of philosophy of scientific experimentation, we 
encounter a similar kind of stability when we look at laboratory science; “[it] is stable” he 
claims, “not because there is a domain of experiment, given by nature itself, to which certain 
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theories are true” but “because there is a mutual maturing of types of apparatus, phenomena and 
theory” (Hacking 1991, 49). Such stability results in disunity, in part, because each laboratory 
science constitutes its own domain in which “bodies of knowledge” are not discarded but rather 
“supplement[ed] with new kinds of instruments” (Hacking 1991, 49).  
At the end of “Disunified Sciences”, Hacking emphasizes the need for a more detailed set 
of conceptual tools to analyze laboratory sciences and to understand how “experimental 
stability” emerges. He provides one such set of conceptual tools in “The Self-Vindication of the 
Laboratory Sciences” (1992), which is the focus of the next section.  
3. Hacking’s Lens: The View from the Philosophy of Experiment 
Hacking (1992) acknowledges that he regards his thesis about the stability of laboratory 
sciences as “an extension of [Pierre] Duhem’s [coherentist] doctrine, that a theory [shown to be] 
inconsistent with an observation can always be saved by modifying an auxiliary hypothesis”, 
even a hypothesis about the working of the very instrument used to test the theory (1992, 30). 
However, according to Hacking, Duhem’s framework for understanding what happens in 
experimental contexts is inadequate because it focuses only on how stability is achieved as 
representations --“theory and auxiliary hypothesis” are “adjusted to each other”. Hacking 
believes philosophers require a richer and more diverse set of tools for understanding 
experimentation and the stability of experimental science that can accommodate “how much of 
the knowledge generated by the laboratory sciences is stable and the devices and practices 
become permanent fixtures of the scientific landscape. To this end, he puts forward a “taxonomy 
of elements of experiment which [he claims] are mutually adjusted” or brought into coherence so 
as “to produce the self-vindicating character of laboratory science” (Hacking 1992, 32).  He 
divides these elements into three categories that are intentionally broad so that each captures a 
wide range of items: (1) ideas, (2) things and (3) marks. In the rest of this section, I will consider 
each of these in turn.  
  Although Hacking sought to shift emphasis in philosophy of science away from theories 
and towards experiments, he did recognize the role that “representations” play in experimental 
contexts. The category of “Ideas” includes those empirical questions about a phenomenon of 
interest that an experiment is designed to answer. For example, is activation of a specific 
population of neurons necessary for spatial memory or visual associative learning? Questions 
may also be directed at the merits and failings of large-scale scientific theories, which is 
particularly common in areas of science like physics, but uncommon in areas like rodent 
behavioral neuroscience. Background knowledge or background beliefs on which an investigator 
relies, which may be neither systematized nor made explicit also fall into Hacking’s ideas 
category. Background beliefs could range from an investigator’s understanding of a concept such 
as spatial memory, to her understanding of how a given intervention or visualization technique 
(e.g., optogenetics) works, to her assumptions about potential confounds to be controlled for 
during an experiment (e.g., feeding times for a rat subject when successful task performance 
requires hunger as motivation). “Ideas” also include high-level “systematic theories” about the 
subject matter under study and “topical hypotheses” that are local to experimental contexts and 
connect together theoretical ideas with the implementation of those ideas in the laboratory in a 
way that is revisable. A final element within the category of ideas involves the understanding on 
the part of the investigator as to the nature and structure of the apparatus (e.g., task analysis) or 
tools that are used to produce data and how those tools actually work. 
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Hacking’s second category, “things” – includes all of the material elements involved in 
an experiment such as: the targets of investigation (e.g., mice and rats, cells, molecules, 
synapses) and the instruments or apparatuses (e.g., optogenetic techniques) used “to alter or 
interfere” with those targets (Hacking 1992, 46). The instruments that serve a productive 
function, for Hacking, insofar as they are used to “create phenomena” (e.g., Hacking 1983; 1992) 
differ from those instruments that are used to detect the effects of the intervention– to “determine 
or measure the result of the interference or modification of the target” (Hacking 1992, 47). The 
broader category of “tools” consists of “all the humble things upon which the experimenter must 
rely” in order to run the experiment—for example, microtomes for slicing tissue samples, 
artificial cerebrospinal fluid for preserving brain tissue samples, or the computer equipment and 
software for running a given cognitive task. Finally, Data generators are the parts of the 
experiment that generate the data (Hacking 1992, 48), such as movement tracking devices and 
reaction-time software–all of the programs that record data, including scientists recording data 
by hand. 
Hacking’s final category, “marks and the manipulation of marks” is intended to include 
the outputs of experiments —the data—as well as those processes to which the data are subject. 
In order to be interpretable, data must be reduced and analyzed statistically. Yet, Hacking 
remarks that it is important to remember that choice of data reduction, data enhancement and 
data analysis techniques are often influenced by “ideas” on the part of investigators including 
background knowledge and theoretical commitments. The final interpretation of the data is also 
done in light of the researcher or research team’s background knowledge, understanding of how 
the apparatus and other tools used in the experiment work and, where relevant, high-level theory. 
Hacking claims that an important part at this stage of the laboratory work is an “estimation of 
systematic error, which requires explicit knowledge of the theory of the apparatus –and which 
has been too little studied by philosophers of science” (Hacking 1992, 49). Since the publication 
of Hacking’s paper, a number of philosophers of science have sought to fill this gap (e.g., Mayo 
1991,1996; Sullivan 2018; Schickore 2005, 2019)    
According to Hacking, the stability of a laboratory science is gradually established as 
these 15 elements falling into the broader categories of "thoughts, actions, materials, and marks” 
are “mutually adjusted to each other” and “what meshes (Kuhn’s word) is at most a network of 
theories, models, approximations, together with understandings of the workings of our 
instruments and apparatus” (Hacking 1992, 30). Laboratory sciences become self-vindicating on 
Hacking’s picture, insofar as eventually, “any test of theory is against apparatus that has evolved 
in conjunction with it—and in conjunction with modes of data analysis” (1992, 30).  
Importantly, laboratory scientists have to engage in strategies of stabilization that bring 
these different elements into consilience. Although Hacking does not acknowledge it explicitly, 
laboratory sciences do not consist of a single laboratory running experiments in isolation, but 
investigators—research teams—running experiments in many different laboratories. The stability 
of experimental science that Hacking describes is thus not something that comes about in a 
single laboratory, but rather, across many different laboratories having investigators who share 
thoughts, actions, materials, marks and strategies for manipulating marks in common and who 
are locally united in bringing these elements into productive symbiosis.  
As I aim to show in the next two sections, Hacking’s taxonomy of elements and views 
about the stability of laboratory science may be used as a foil for understanding why instability 
may occur in some laboratory sciences, not merely due to the fact that these sciences are on the 
cutting-edge, but also that researchers in the field may be engaged in practices that effectively 
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destabilize the field insofar as their actions are not directed at bringing these elements into 
consilience. In such instances of instability, we may anticipate a lack of conceptual, 
methodological and explanatory unity within these fields. Also, in light of Hacking’s framework, 
the possibility that a given laboratory science may stabilize in any number of ways depending 
upon who the actors are, and what ideas, actions, materials and marks they aim to bring into 
consilience is consistent with local unity, but as Hacking (1991) indicates, global disunity.  
In the next section (Section 4), I use Hacking’s framework to identify those aspects of 
experimental practice in rodent behavioral neuroscience that have served to promote the 
instability of the field and have been a barrier to the production of stable knowledge pertaining to 
the neural underpinnings of rodent cognition. The kind of instability that we encounter here is 
consistent with what might be regarded as counterproductive disunity. Yet, if Hacking is correct, 
there is such a thing as productive disunity—and it correlates with areas of science implementing 
strategies to arrive at stable knowledge—strategies that simultaneously result in the creation of 
phenomena, and the development of specialized languages and methods and associated practices 
that co-evolve and become “self-vindicating”.  
 
4. Rodent Behavioral Neuroscience Through Hacking’s Lens  
  In Section 1, I briefly described some basic features of the structure of experiments in 
rodent behavioral neuroscience. I now want to elaborate on the structure of research in this field 
and evaluate it by way of Hacking’s framework of “ideas, things, and marks”.  
  First, consider Hacking’s concept of “ideas”, a category which includes empirical 
questions about phenomena of interest, high-level theories, background assumptions, topical 
hypothesis that relate theories to observations made in experimental contexts and beliefs about 
how a given experimental apparatus or tool works. As I mentioned in Section 1, researchers 
working in rodent behavioral neuroscience hail from a variety of different research traditions and 
theoretical backgrounds (e.g., animal psychology, neurophysiology) and have different technical 
expertise (e.g., expertise in assessing animal behavior or skill using in vivo circuit techniques). 
Given such differences, they do not necessarily agree about how to define terms typically used to 
designate cognitive functions (e.g., attention, working memory and motivation) and each field 
“contributes a distinctive vocabulary of terms and acronyms, all embedded to some degree or 
another in zeitgeists and conceptual frameworks” (Roediger, Dudai, and Fitzpatrick 2007, 1). 
Although we do not encounter high-level theories in rodent behavioral neuroscience, researchers 
do have background assumptions about phenomena of interest, assumptions about what kinds of 
apparatus and tools are appropriate for addressing their empirical questions, theoretical 
understandings that inform the development of cognitive tasks and the use of intervention 
techniques as well as their understanding of how the tasks and tools they use actually work. Yet, 
differences in theoretical backgrounds, training and technical expertise across the field correlate 
with differences across researchers with respect to all of the different kinds of “ideas” that 
Hacking itemizes. 
  We encounter similar diversity with respect to Hacking’s category of “things”; a number 
of different tasks may be used to study the “same” cognitive function, and not only do 
investigators differ with respect to what they regard as the most appropriate task or apparatus, 
but even when they use the same tool to investigate the same function, it is not uncommon for 
them to vary overall features of the task (e.g., stimuli, intertrial intervals) slightly (e.g., Sullivan 
2009). Researchers also have different intuitions with respect to which tasks are most appropriate 
for measuring which functions and are granted the freedom to use those tasks and task 
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parameters they deem most suitable for achieving their investigative aims, just so long as they 
provide good reasons for their choices from the perspective of peer review.  
  Differences in training also may impact the design and implementation of rodent 
behavioral experiments. For example, an expert in rodent behavior may be privy to aspects of an 
experimental design that may impact the behavioral performance of a mouse in a cognitive task 
(e.g., over-handling of the animal during different phases of the experiment) and confound the 
establishment of causal relationships between neural activity and behavior. They thus may 
modify aspects of the experimental protocol or specific task parameters with the aim of 
eliminating these confounds. In contrast, a researcher who is an expert in using 
neurophysiological techniques may be concerned with a different set of potential confounds 
having to do with consequences downstream of a pharmacological intervention. Such potential 
differences in epistemic standards that correlate with differences in expertise may thus exist. 
However, it is widely recognized that such methodological differences may result in differences 
in findings across laboratories purportedly investigating the same cognitive function (See for 
example, Crabbe, Wahlsten, Dudek 1999; Graybeal, Bachu, Mozhui et al. 2014; Sullivan 2009). 
This means that findings from multiple different research studies purportedly investigating 
mechanisms of the same phenomena cannot readily be integrated into unified explanations of 
common phenomena. And yet, discovering the neural mechanisms of cognition is not something 
that can take place in a single lab or in the context of a single research study. It requires 
contributions from many laboratories, not only to produce piecemeal findings about components 
of the neural mechanisms that give rise to a given cognitive function, but also to reproduce 
findings across laboratories (Beraldo, Palmer, Memar et al., 2019; Button, Ioannidis, Mokrysz, et 
al., 2013). 
 With respect to Hacking’s category of “marks”, researchers working in different 
laboratories also may use a variety of different tools for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting 
data, and employ different strategies to probe for and reduce error. Choices about which data 
analysis tools to use, what kinds of errors to probe and control for also vary with respect to one’s 
training and technical expertise. An additional issue is that experiments in rodent cognitive 
neuroscience combine tools for assessing cognition with state-of-the-art visualization and/or 
intervention technologies. Yet, the error characteristics, especially of newer intervention and 
visualization technologies (e.g., optogenetics (Sullivan 2018), may not yet be known. A final and 
related issue is the lack of emphasis on the development of behavioral experiments that carefully 
individuate psychological functions involved in task performance and insure that the criterion of 
construct validity—that a given cognitive task actually measures the cognitive function it is 
intended to measure—is met prior to moving to experiments directed at identifying the neural 
underpinnings of these functions (e.g., Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, et al. 2016; Niv 
2020). There are thus epistemic blind spots in rodent behavioral neuroscience that are obstacles 
to the field advancing an understanding of the neural underpinnings of psychological functions.    
Given the aforementioned observations, there is no sense in which the relationship 
between “ideas, materials, marks and [the] manipulation of marks” that we encounter in 
contemporary rodent behavioral neuroscience is stable, nor is the field on a trajectory towards 
stability. Yet, instability of the kind we find here is regarded by some neuroscientists themselves 
(i.e., those that I have cited in this section) as a barrier to progress in their field. Particularly in 
translational areas of cognitive neuroscience, in which the aim is to develop effective therapeutic 
interventions to treat neuropsychiatric and neurodegenerative disease-related cognitive 
impairments, the importance of reproducibility and the gradual coordinated accumulation of 
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stable knowledge is regarded as essential for progress. In recent years, large-scale and smaller-
scale collaborative grass roots initiatives have emerged with an eye towards stability of the kind 
Hacking describes. I turn now to analysis of these initiatives. 
 
4. Recent developments in Rodent Behavioral Neuroscience Through Hacking’s Lens.  
In the first two decades of the 21st century, several large-scale initiatives were established 
in order to accelerate the discovery of novel therapeutic interventions to treat cognitive 
impairments in neuropsychiatric and neurodegenerative disease. Representative examples 
include the Cognitive Neuroscience Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia 
(CNTRICS) initiative (e.g., Carter and Barch 2007; Moore, Geyer, et al. 2013), NEWMeds (e.g., 
Stensbøl and Kapur), and the US National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria 
Project (NIMH RDoC) (e.g., Insel, Cuthbert, Garvey et al., 2010; Cuthbert & Kozack 2013). 
Each of these initiatives have brought together rodent behavioral neuroscientists, clinical 
researchers, cognitive neuroscientists working with humans and/or animal models, systems 
neuroscientists and members of the pharmaceutical industry with the aims of (1) developing 
more representative mouse models of neurodegenerative and neuropsychiatric diseases 
(“things”), (2) identifying a set of collaboratively agreed-upon psychological constructs 
corresponding to functions regarded as impaired in these diseases, (“ideas”) (3) improving tools 
for assessing cognition in humans and mice (“things” and “manipulation of marks”), and (4) 
increasing the similarity of tools used for the behavioral assessment of cognitive functions across 
researchers and species (“things”).  
One way to understand the aims of these initiatives is to develop stable knowledge about 
the neural underpinnings of cognition and disruptions in neural circuitry that underlie these 
impairments in order to identify those circuits that may be targeted for therapeutic intervention. 
The measures that researchers involved in these initiatives regard as essential to these goals, are 
to develop a shared set of theoretical constructs (e.g., cognitive control, working memory) and 
types of apparatus/tasks (e.g., the Jitter orientation visual integration task (JOVI)) that are to be 
standardized across researchers working with human subjects and animal models, as well as a 
shared set of materials (e.g., apparatus, tasks, mouse models of disease) that are to be used in the 
drive to identify novel targets for therapeutic intervention. As Hacking claims, data interpretation 
relies on an investigator’s background assumptions and theoretical commitments. Insofar as 
investigators involved in these initiatives are committed to a discreet set of theoretical constructs 
and general definitions of those constructs, the hope is that there will be some degree of 
consensus in how to interpret the data arising out of human and animal research. Thus, these 
initiatives are at least in theory aiming for coherence among Hacking-like elements—concepts, 
materials, and marks—that are disunified in cognitive neuroscience more generally.  
These large-scale government supported research initiatives are on-going, however, to 
date, they have not produced stable knowledge or major advances in our understanding of 
cognition and cognitive dysfunction. While a number of reasons may be cited—clearly this is 
research on the cutting-edge and it is still early days—but one feature that such initiatives lack is 
an infrastructure to facilitate the stabilization of “ideas, things, and marks” across research 
groups and laboratories. It is one thing to point to changes that need to be made to experimental 
practice to facilitate progress and the production of stable knowledge and another thing for 
researchers to collaboratively implement these stabilization strategies across laboratories to 
achieve these goals.  
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The recent development of more grass-roots collaborative initiatives in rodent behavioral 
neuroscience (e.g., Beraldo, Palmer, Memar, et al. 2019; Dumont, Salewski, Beraldo, et al. 2020; 
Sullivan et al. 2020) and systems and computational neuroscience (with a focus on rodent 
behavioral research) (e.g., International Brain Laboratory 2017; Wool 2020) to accelerate 
discovery in these fields is suggestive that some researchers believe that achieving stability with 
respect to “ideas, things and marks” requires an unprecedented level of coordination across labs 
and research groups and an infrastructure similar to that found in other areas of science that have 
achieved stability historically, including physics and genomics (International Brain Laboratory 
2017; Beraldo, Palmer, Memar et al., 2019). My aim in the rest of this section is to briefly 
evaluate these two grass-roots initiatives through Hacking’s lens. 
The first such initiative I want to consider has emerged around novel platform , the 
Mouse Translational Research Accelerator Platform (MouseTRAP) (Sullivan et al. 2020). 
Spearheaded by researchers at Western University, MouseTRAP is centered on a touchscreen 
cognitive testing system for rodents, the Bussey-Saksida touchscreen system (e.g., Bussey, Muir, 
Robbins 1994; Bussey, Holmes, Lyon, et al. 2012; Bussey, Rothblat, Saksida 2001). The system 
consists of an operant chamber with a touchscreen upon which visual stimuli are presented. 
Rodents are trained and tested on different cognitive tasks using these visual stimuli and are 
required to respond directly to the visual stimuli with nose-pokes. Correct choices are rewarded 
with a drop of strawberry milkshake or a food pellet. There are currently over 20 different rodent 
touchscreen-based tasks for assessing cognitive functions in rodents ranging from working 
memory to cognitive flexibility to decision-making. The tasks are fully automated, ensuring the 
accuracy of task parameters and measures, and infrared beams and video tracking devices are 
used to monitor an animal’s behavior while it performs in the apparatus. These features make the 
testing system and associated tasks readily standardizable across laboratories, allowing 
researchers all over the globe to use the same apparatus, stimuli, task parameters, appetitive 
rewards and data production and data analysis techniques.   
In order to increase the reproducibility of rodent behavioral research and in response to 
increasing demand for the technology, the Bussey-Saksida touchscreen system was 
commercialized in 2009. Bussey, Saksida and colleagues published three invited papers in 
Nature Protocols (e.g., Horner, Heath, Hvoslef-Eide, et al.) with step-by-step instructions on 
how to prepare animals for training in the apparatus, how to pretrain and train the animals and 
how to analyze the behavioral data. As of December 2020, over 300 different research groups in 
more than 200 research institutes in at least 26 countries are using the touchscreen technology 
(Dumont, Salewski, Beraldo 2020). In 2018, two novel Open Science platforms were established 
to facilitate pre-publication knowledge-sharing (touchscreencognition.org) and data-sharing 
(mousebytes.ca) among members of the rodent touchscreen community. A primary aim of these 
Open Science platforms is “to create a community of scientists who share common methodology 
and are united in the goals of increasing methodological transparency and improving the 
reliability and reproducibility of research findings” (Sullivan, Dumont, Memar et al. 2020, 10). 
If we consider MouseTRAP from the vantage point of Hacking’s taxonomy of elements 
of experimental science, it possesses those features that lend themselves to the development of 
stable science—efforts are in fact being made to ensure that researchers share a common 
methodology for conducting research into the neural underpinnings of cognition, that they share 
ideas—for example, empirical questions directed at specific phenomena (e.g., cognitive 
functions and impairments), topical hypotheses that relate specific understandings of those 
phenomena to what is observed in the laboratory, an understanding of how the apparatus works 
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in the collection and production of data. They also share “things” in common—the targets of 
investigation (e.g., rodents, mouse models of disease), how to prepare those targets (as specified 
in the published protocols, and standardized operating procedures that are available on 
touchscreencognition.org), the touchscreen operant chamber itself and the tools (e.g., video-
tracking devices) used to collect data. Those researchers who elect to use the methodology also 
share “marks and the manipulation of marks” -- techniques of data assessment and analysis in 
common, and they are also at liberty to take advantage of Open Science platforms that allow 
them to share their knowledge, input and visualize their data and integrate and compare their data 
with data from other laboratories using the same methodology. MouseTRAP is suggestive of the 
fundamental role that scientists themselves must play to collaboratively produce stable science as 
Hacking conceives of it.4 
Another notable collaborative grass-roots initiative is the International Brain Laboratory 
((IBL)2017; Wool 2020). It consists of ~80 researchers from 22 experimental and theoretical 
laboratories across the globe who are collaboratively aiming to identify the neural basis of 
decision-making. These researchers are using a standardized “steering-wheel task for head-fixed 
mice” in order to identify those brain areas that are involved in “decisions” made on the basis of 
“visual perception” and “history of reward” (IBL 2017, 1213). Using the same behavioral task 
across 22 laboratories, researchers in each laboratory will “record from many different brain 
areas” during task performance “using multiple recording modalities to build up a dense dataset 
of activity measurements during the task” (IBL 2017, 1213). These datasets will then be 
analyzed using computational techniques in order to understand how multiple brain regions 
interact during this task. IBL was developed because of the observed success of “team science” 
in other areas of science including physics and genomics. Moreover, “a critical IBL mandate is 
to ensure that theory and experiment converge at the ground level, and perpetually throughout 
[the] scientific process” (2020, 6).  
IBL emphasizes the importance of bringing Hacking’s elements of stability into a kind of 
consilience. The community seeks to ensure that members share theoretical and background 
knowledge, the same physical materials and tools and the same data production and data analysis 
techniques. They even emphasize the importance of “stabiliz[ing] large-scale collaborative 
science in traditional academia” in order to achieve the goal of “understanding the neural 
computations that support decision-making” (IBL 2018, 1213).  
One way to conceive of these grass-roots initiatives is that they regard the accumulation 
of knowledge of the neural underpinnings of cognition to require what I described in Section 3 as 
“productive disunity”. Such disunity involves the collaborative breaking off of smaller groups of 
investigators from how practice in a given area of science is traditionally done, in instances in 
which sticking with tradition involves “counterproductive disunity” that is antithetical to 
progress. It is an interesting question whether laboratory sciences like those Hacking (1992) uses 
as a basis for understanding stability began with small-scale collaborative revolutions much like 
these ones.    
   
6. Conclusion.  
 
4I have referred to such collaboration as “perspectival pluralism” (2014) and “coordinated pluralism” 
(2018). Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) concept of “epistemic culture” and Ankeny and Leonelli’s (2015) concept of 
“repertoire” also may be used to shed interesting and important light on how stability or stable knowledge are 
collaboratively achieved in science.   
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I want to end by teasing out some implications of my analysis for the unity of 
neuroscience and say something briefly, from the perspective of Hacking’s lens, about the kinds 
we are liable to encounter in rodent behavioral neuroscience if such grass-roots initiatives are 
successful. 
First, it is relevant to note that the experimental apparatuses at the heart of both of these 
initiatives satisfy Hacking’s condition that laboratory sciences “create new phenomena”. 
Nowhere in the world (as far as I know), except in laboratories that use rodent operant 
touchscreens, do we encounter rodents interacting with and engaging in cognitive tasks with 
computer touchscreens. Similarly, we do not encounter head-fixed mice out and about in the 
world turning steering wheels in response to visual stimuli. The kinds of cognitive functions 
under study using these apparatuses are created in laboratories. This does not make them any less 
real, but it is important to recognize the precise type of workmanship that goes into creating them 
(e.g., Boyd 2000). Moreover, if these small-scale initiatives are ultimately successful, they may 
yield what might be dubbed “coordinated kinds” (Mattu, Sullivan, In Press)– the result of the 
concerted alignment of conceptual and methodological practices across discrete research groups 
with respect to “ideas, things, and marks”.  To the extent that different such research groups 
emerge in cognitive neuroscience and are successful, organizing their practices around discrete 
sets of concepts, apparatus, tools, and data, we might imagine a plurality of discrete taxonomies 
of cognitive kinds that are stable but isolated from each other—a kind of “promiscuous realism” 
(Dupre 1993).5 
Second, insofar as the creation of these phenomena and investigations into their 
mechanisms are to be collaboratively subserved by small groups of researchers, and if such 
collaborations are successful in bringing about a kind of local stability – the kind of findings 
such research groups make about neural mechanisms are likely to be domain-specific – specific, 
for example, to those “ideas, things, and marks” that these groups collaboratively bring into 
consilience to achieve stable knowledge. This is consistent with Hacking’s (1991) idea that 
successful stability is consistent with disunity—that it actually requires disunity—it requires a 
kind of isolation of a domain from factors that are antithetical to its stability.   
On a final note, Hacking would likely be skeptical that these collaborative initiatives, 
even if they can yield stable knowledge about the neural mechanisms of cognition in rodents, 
will ultimately shed light on the mechanisms of human cognition, because “human kinds” are 
“unstable” in ways that make them unamenable to experimental control (e.g., Hacking 1995, 
1999). Partially for reasons of space, evaluating and responding to such skeptical concerns will 
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